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Elizabeth Shilton*

Employee Pension Rights and the
False Promise of Trust Law

This article explores the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada on
employment pension trusts. I argue that the Court's 1994 decision in Schmidt v.
Air Products, which embraced trust law as a tool for resolving pension surplus
ownership disputes, held out the promise that courts would use fiduciary
principles to shape pension rights for employees and protect those rights against
employer self-interest. That promise has failed to bear much fruit. Since Schmidt,
the Court has moved away from a conception of trust law as a fetter on employer
power towards a flexible conception in which employer trust obligations are
defined almost entirely by the terms of pension documents which those employers
have themselves drafted. In the hands of Canadian courts, trust law has failed
to operate as an independent source of rights for plan beneficiaries; instead, it
has empowered employers to frame and administer plans in accordance with
their own interests, even when those interests conflict with those of employee
plan members. I argue that the common law offered the courts other choices;
the choices they made reflect a commitment to employer pension control as
fundamental to the survival of a voluntary employment pension system.

Cet article examine la jurisprudence de la Cour supreme du Canada sur les
caisses de retraite ddtenues en fiducie. Je pr6tends que I'arr6trendu par la Cour
en 1994 dans Schmidt c. Air Products Canada Ltd., arrdt qui privildgiait les lois
rdgissant les fiducies comme outil pour rdgler les diffdrends concernant le droit au
surplus accumule dans les rdgimes de pension, faisait miroiter la promesse que
les tribunaux se fonderaient sur les obligations fiduciaires pour ddfinir les droits de
pension des employds et pour protdger ces droits contre l'intdrdt personnel des
employeurs. Cette promesse s'est depuis rdv4lde 6tre une coquille vide. Depuis
larrt Schmidt, la Cour s'est d/oignde d'une conception des lois sur les fiducies
comme n'ayant aucune incidence sur les pouvoirs des employeurs pour privildgier
une approche plus souple o) les obligations fiduciaires des employeurs sont
ddfinies presque exclusivement par les modalitds des documents sur les rdgimes
de pension rddig6s unilatdralement par ces derniers. Selon Iinterprdtationque
leur ont donnde les tribunaux canadiens, les lois regissant les fiducies n'ont pas
joud leur rdle comme source inddpendante de droits pour les bdndficiaires des
rdgimes de retraite; au lieu de cela, elles ont permis aux employeurs de structurer
et d'administrer les rdgimes pour servir leurs propres intbr~ts, mdme lorsque ces
inthr6ts sont en conflit avec les intdr~ts des employds membres des rdgimes.
J'avance que la common law offrait d'autres possibilitds aux tribunaux; les choix
qu'ils ont faits reflLtent un parti pris en fa veur du contr6le par les employeurs des
rdgimes de pension comme etant un diament essentiel pour la survie d'un rdgime
de pension o0 les cotisations [des employes] seraient volontaires.

Senior Fellow, Centre for Law in the Contemporary Workplace, Queen's University. I am
grateful to both Philip Girard and Kerry Rittich for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.
*
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Introduction
In 1996, Eileen Gillese published a pioneering article entitled "Pension
Plans and the Law of Trusts."' In her article, Gillese described pension law
as a "very new field for lawyers," still in search of an analytical framework.
She proposed trust law as the foundation for that framework. Trust law
and equity, she argued, "contain the principles and approaches which
can lead to a sensible and successful development of this new area of the
law"2 ; we should adopt them as "our guides" to a coherent framework for
employment pension rights and obligations.
At the time, Gillese's advice seemed entirely realistic. Two years
previously, the Supreme Court of Canada had decided Schmidt v. Air
Products,' embracing trust law as a tool for resolving employer-employee
disputes over ownership and control of surplus in employer-sponsored
defined benefit (DB) pension plans.' A pension trust, the Court had opined,
is a "classic" or "true" trust,6 subject to "all applicable trust law principles."'

I. Eileen Gillese, "Pension Plans and the Law of Trusts" (1996) 75 CBR 221 at 223. When she
wrote this article, Gillese was a law dean and chair of the Pension Commission of Ontario. She is now
a Justice of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Ibid at 224.
2.
3. Ibid at 250.
4. Schmidt v Air Products Canada Ltd, [1994] 2 SCR 611, rev'g in part [1992] AJ no 315 (CA),
affg [1990] AJ no 176 (Q13).
The issues addressed in this paper relate primarily to employer-sponsored (i.e. employer5.
established and administered) DB plans. While many such plans are found in unionized workplaces,
they frequently remain vulnerable to the unilateral employer control discussed in this paper: see
Elizabeth J Shilton, Gifts or Rights?: A Legal History of Employment Pension Plans in Canada(SJD
Thesis, University of Toronto, 2011) [unpublished], particularly chapter 3.
Schmidt, supranote 4 at para 52.
6.
Ibid at para 58.
7.
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Trust law's promise of a firm anchorage for beneficiary interests in a
sea of contract law otherwise controlled by all-powerful employers was
greeted warmly by employees and their pension advocates.' Employers
were much less enthusiastic; sharing the perception that Schmidt favoured
employee interests, they embarked on a sustained legislative lobby against
the application of trust law to pension plans which continues to this day.9 It
is now obvious, however, that Schmidt has done little to change the power
dynamic within pension plans. Schmidt's categorical injunction to apply
trust principles to pension trusts has created much confusion for parties to
the pension relationship, spawning extensive and expensive litigation.o
Since Schmidt, however, employees bringing trust law-based challenges
to employer control over pension plans have lost out consistently at the
Supreme Court level." For employee pension rights, the promise of trust
law has proved to be a false one.
In this paper I argue that Schmidt, employee-friendly on the surface,
in fact sowed the seeds for much less employee-friendly developments.
On the narrow issue of surplus ownership, Schmidt placed some modest
fetters on employer control. On the broader issues at the core of the case,
however-issues about the meaning of the employment pension 'deal,'
and the scope of the employer's power both to frame and amend that 'deal'
in its own interests-Schmidt's approach to trust principles left ample
room for the evolution of the Court's more recent jurisprudence, which
enhances rather than restricts employer power over pension plans and
pension funds. In Part I, I survey the practical and legal background to the
problems posed by Schmidt. In Part II, I analyze in detail Schmidt's majority
judgment, and explore some of the conceptual and practical difficulties
posed by its attempt to apply conventional trust rules to the employment
pension context. In Part III, focusing on three of the Supreme Court of
Canada's recent pension decisions, Buschau v. Rogers Cablesystems

8.
See, for example, Ari Kaplan, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 91 and 554.
9.
See, for example, Back from the Brink: Securing the Future of Defined Benefit Plans, online:
<http://www.acpm.com/resources/7/pdf/ACFD2B.pdf'>.
10. See Anthony Devir, "Fiduciary Obligations and Surplus Issues in Pension Plans: The Employers'
Perspective" (1998-1999) 18 Est Tr & Pensions J 317 at 337-338, and Douglas Rienzo, "Trust Law
and Access to Pension Surplus" (2005-2006) 25 Est Tr & Pensions J 14 at 28-29 for discussions of
the legal problems posed by Schmidt for parties attempting to administer plans, and for some of the
regulatory responses to Schmidt. See also Kaplan, supra note 8, C 10; subsequent jurisprudence has
overtaken Kaplan's optimistic conclusion that Schmidt "settled" the law in this area (554, 566).
11. See cases cited at infra notes 12, 13 and 14. Monsanto CanadaInc v Ontario(Superintendent of
FinancialServices), [2004] 3 SCR 152, arguably a victory for employees, was an exercise in statutory
interpretation, not an application of trust law.
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Ltd.;12 Nolan v. Kerry (Canada)Ltd.;3 and Burke v. Hudson Bay Co.,14
I examine the Court's increasing affirmation of the power of employers
to manage employment pension plans in their own interests. I argue that
our Supreme Court's current version of trust law fails to recognize and
protect a role for employee interests. Courts, who share a responsibility
with legislatures for distributive outcomes within employment pension
plans, must be challenged to reframe issues of employment pension rights
so as to recognize the employment context within which pension plans
operate, and take employee interests into account.
I.

Trust law and employment pension plans: a briefhistory

1. Searchingfor a legalframeworkfor employment pension rights
Employment pension plans in Canada date back to the 19th century.
From the outset, they have been initiated, designed and controlled almost
exclusively by employers, their history part of the history of modem
management practice. Throughout the 20th century, Canadian courts
have struggled to rationalize these plans within the narrow categories
known to the common law. Early courts characterized pensions as gifts
from benevolent employers to old and faithful servants.'I As late as 1951,
Canadian courts still insisted that pension payments were "voluntary" and
not part of an employee's compensation.' 6 By the 1960s, Canadian courts,
at least in part under the influence of collective bargaining legislation,
had begun to recognize employee pension rights," but continued to have
problems defining them with precision. Judges referred to "the promise of
a pension as a contractual obligation,"" but exactly what was promised
was never specified. Appellate courts characterized pensions as "present

12. Buschau v Rogers Cablesystems Ltd, 2006 SCC 28, [2006] 1 SCR 973, rev'g 2004 BCCA 80
[Buschau 2004 BCCA] and 2004 BCCA 282 [Buschau 2004 BCCA No 2].
13. Nolan v Kerry (Canada)Inc, 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 SCR 678, aff'g (2007), 86 OR (3d) I (CA),
rev'g (2006), 209 OAC 271 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Kerry 2006 ONSC], rev'g [2004] OFSCD no 192 [Kerry
OFSCD No 1], and [2004] OFSCD no 193 [Kerry OFSCD No 2].
14. Burke v Hudson's Bay Co, 2010 SCC 34, [2010] 2 SCR 273, aff'g 2008 ONCA 394 [Burke
ONCA], rev'g [2005] OTC 1076 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Burke ONSC].
15. See, for example, Murray Webb Latimer, IndustrialPension Systems in the United States and
Canada(New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932) at chapters XIV and XV.
16. See Flintoft Estate v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1951] Ex CR 211. See also
Williamson v Ontario (Treasurer), [ 1941] OJ no 206 (HC); McDougall v MNR, [ 1949149 Ex CR 314;
Heirs of NT Cronk, representedby Barclays Trust Co of Canada v MNR, [ 1949] 49 DTC 612 (Ex Ct
Ca).
17. One of the first cases to recognize pensions as rights within the contract of employment was
Bardal v Globe & Mail Ltd (1960), 24 DLR (2d) 140 (HC) at para 28.
18. Otis Canada Inc v Ontario (Superintendentof Pensions) (1991), 2 OR (3d) 737 (Gen Div) at
para 44.
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wages postponed or deferred," 9 but the meaning of that highly ambiguous
concept was never judicially explored.
The modem common law characterizes the employment relationship as
a contract. Efforts to apply contract law to pension plans have nevertheless
presented courts with on-going practical and conceptual challenges.
Modem pension plans are typically not generated by conventional
bilateral negotiation; they are drafted and established unilaterally by
employers. The complex documents which constitute such plans are not
normally supplied to employees, who may be unaware of their precise
terms.20 Plan texts typically reserve to employers a broad unilateral right
to amend the plan, including the right to terminate it. 21 Employers make
full use of these powers of amendment, with the result that many plans
have complex histories reflecting both structural and substantive changes
over time. Except as imagined by the law, pension plans do not reflect the
"intention of the parties"; at best, they are 'contracts of adhesion,' 2 2 with
the additional complication that because one party to the contract retains
the unilateral right to change its terms, rights and obligations remain fluid
even after contract formation.
The legal status of employment pension arrangements is further
complicated by the relationship between pension plans and their funding
instruments. Early pension plans were typically of the 'pay-as-you-go'
variety, with benefits paid to retired employees out of operating funds.
The Great Depression persuaded many employers that some form of
'pre-funding' for pension obligations made sound business sense. While
smaller employers pre-funded through the purchase of annuities, larger

19. Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Boardv Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board
(1999), 45 OR (3d) 622 (CA) at para 21.
20. See Morley Gunderson & Andrew Luchak, "What do Employees Know about their Pension
Plans?" (2004) 39 IndustrialRelations 646. While regulatory statutes typically guarantee employees
access to plan documents on request, they do not insist that employees be provided with copies: see,
for example, see PensionBenefits Act, RSO 1990, c P.8 [PBA], ss 29-30 and RRO 1990, Reg 909, s 45.
21. A typical power of amendment is found in the 'Steams Plan,' quoted in Schmidt, supra note 4 at
Appendix A:
The Company retains the right to amend or modify or terminate the Plan in whole or in part, at
any time and from time to time, and in such manner and to such extent as it may deem advisable,
subject to the following provisos:
(a) No amendment shall have the effect of reducing any Participant's, former Participant's,
joint annuitant's, beneficiary's, or estate's then existing interest in the Fund;
(b) No amendment shall have the effect of diverting any part of the Fund to purposes other
than for the exclusive benefit of the Participants, former Participants, joint annuitants,
beneficiaries, or estates.
22. 'Contract of adhesion' is a term applied to standard-form contracts offered on a take-it-or-leaveit basis by parties in a stronger bargaining position: see Friedrich Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum L Rev 629.
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companies typically preferred to accumulate dedicated pools of cash from
which periodic pensions could be paid. A popular 'off-the-shelf' vehicle
provided by the financial services industry for such accumulation was the
modem pension trust.23
Pension trusts were typically constituted by agreements between
employers and trust companies. From at least the mid-1940s, the terms
of these agreements were significantly influenced by the requirements of
the income tax authorities. Concerned to ensure that pension funds were
used to pay pensions, and not as tax-sheltered employer 'slush funds,'
income tax rules required that to qualify for beneficial tax treatment, plans
must provide that if they were discontinued, "all monies paid under the
plan must vest absolutely in the employees concerned and any surplus
not apportioned must be distributed by an equitable formula to provide
increased benefits for those employees then covered."2 4 Pension plans
and template trust agreements met that requirement with a variable mix
of provisions ensuring that the fund was for the exclusive benefit of the
employees ('exclusive benefit' clauses), that contributions to the fund
were irrevocable ('irrevocability' clauses), and that any surplus would
be allocated to the plan beneficiaries on termination rather than returned
to the employer ('non-reversion' clauses). The relationship between the
pension plan and the funding agreement was typically cemented through
such drafting techniques as incorporation by reference.25
The complex of intertwined documents and legal relationships
constituting the employment pension plan gave rise to a host of difficult
questions about the legal character of employee pension rights, including
questions about the nexus between plan texts and funding instruments, the
nature and extent of enforceable employer pension commitments and the
power of employers to alter those commitments. The advent of regulatory
statutes in the 1960s left many of these questions unresolved, and raised

23. Modem pension trusts have little legal continuity with older traditions of noblesse oblige, in
which wealthy individuals established trusts to provide pensions for 'old retainers.' These early
pension trusts were not associated with contractual obligations, and raised their own unique legal
issues within the law of charitable trusts: see, for eg Jones v TEaton Co, [1973] SCR 635.
24. Statement of Principles and Rules respecting Pension Plans for the Purposes of The Income
War Tax Act: Tax Ruling No. 2 (1946-4 7) (Taxation Division, Ministry of National Revenue, undated)
at para 14 (the Blue Book). For the status of mid-century tax rules, see generally William Latimer,
"Pension Plans and Income Tax" in Laurence E Coward, ed, Pensions in Canada: A Compendium of
Fact and Opinion (Don Mills, Ont: CCH Canadian Ltd, 1964) 103; and Robert M Clark, Economic
Securityfor the Aged in the UnitedStates and Canada: A Report Preparedfor the Government of
Canada(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960) at 45-54.
25. This linkage was required by the tax rules, which specified that pension plans and trusts "must
together form the plan": see, for example, InformationBulletin No. 14 (Department of Revenue, circa
1959) at para 15(a).
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new ones about the relationship between plan documents and statutory
provisions. As long as the value of pension funds did not exceed the value
of the periodic benefits provided under the plans, these legal 'loose ends'
posed few practical problems. When pension funds began substantially to
exceed the amounts needed to pay for periodic benefits, however, Canadian
courts were forced to confront many unresolved legal questions imbedded
in the employment pension relationship.
2. Pension surpluses
Although pension funds were in widespread use since at least the 1940s,
pension surpluses did not begin to emerge in Canada as a prominent legal
issue until the 1980s, a result of changes both in the regulatory and the
economic climate. 26 Prior to the advent of statutory regulation in the 1960s,
pension funds were not required to meet solvency standards. Tax rules
requiring actuaries to 'certify' plan contributions were aimed at limiting
the amounts sheltered by pension funds, rather than at ensuring that these
funds held enough to pay benefits. 27 First-generation regulatory statutes
changed the rules, generally requiring that plans maintain assets sufficient
to meet their liabilities. Since pension liabilities were future-looking,
however, the value of both assets and liabilities were projections, based on
actuarial assumptions about such factors as investment returns, inflation,
and turnover among plan members. When events in the real world did not
conform to projections, plans could fall either into deficit or into surplus.28
In the 1980s, a variety of economic events converged to produce
significant deviations from projections on both asset and liability sides of
many pension ledgers, sending numerous Canadian DB plans into surplus.2 9
Employers hungry for capital began to search for ways to access these
surpluses.3 0 Their most visible strategy was outright withdrawal of surplus
from the fund. Surplus withdrawal normally required regulatory approval,
with legal rules and regulatory protocols varying across the country.
Some jurisdictions required employers to establish legal ownership of
26. See Kaplan, supra note 8, c 10. At 606, Kaplan provides a detailed list of Canadian surplus
ownership cases to 2004. Only two cases on his list pre-date 1980.
27. See, for example, Blue Book, supra note 24 at para 7 (Past Service Contributions).
28. See Frank Livsey & David A Short, "The Development of Funding Surpluses in Canadian
Pension Plans" in Task Force on Inflation Protectionfor Employment Pension Plans, Research
Studies, Vol I (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988) (Task Force).
29. This issue is canvassed in detail in the scholarly and professional literature of the era: see,
for example, Gary Nachshen, "Access to Pension Fund Surpluses: The Great Debate" in New
Developments in Employment Law, Meredith Memorial Lectures, Faculty of Law, McGill University
1988 (Yvon Blais: Cowansville, 1988) 60, and articles by Donovan Waters at 133, Ralph E Scane at
157, Raymond Koskie at 181 and Bernard Adell at 209, in Task Force, supra note 28.
30. See Nachshen, ibid at 61.
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surplus prior to withdrawal." Where plan documents allocated surplus to
employees, many employers exercised their broad powers of amendment
to redirect surplus to themselves. Canadian tax authorities gave impetus
to such amendments, issuing new guidelines effective 1 January 1982
which capped amounts that could accumulate within pension funds
and, in a reversal of prior policy, required monies above the cap to be
returned to the employer.32 When plan members challenged employer
surplus withdrawals, they often found out in the course of litigation that
employers had been employing less visible surplus 'extraction' strategies
for years, taking "contribution holidays,"" and using plan surpluses to pay
on-going plan expenses that employees had believed were being paid out
of operating funds.34
At the root of the surplus ownership debate was a profound dissensus
on some basic questions about the nature and scope of employment pension
obligations, issues on which pension documents were often imprecise.
Employees claimed pension funds as part of their contractual entitlement,
while employers maintained that such funds were simply a convenient
employer-owned mechanism for meeting benefit obligations. Both sides
bolstered legal and interpretive arguments by focusing on the equities of
their respective positions." Employers maintained that pension obligations
were limited to benefits; the cost of the benefits was irrelevant.3 6 Under
modem statutory rules, they argued, employers take the risk of deficits
in a DB plan; it is only fair that they should be able to take the benefit of
surpluses. Employees and their advocates countered that both the promise
to pay future pensions and the funds set aside to do so were part and parcel
of 'deferred wages,' earned by employees as concretely as their salaries.
Employer contributions, they argued, are "foregone wages," entitling
employees "to whatever those contributions have produced."" For

31. Both Nachshen (ibid at 67-70 and 81-85) and Adell (supra note 29 at 219-22) discuss the status
of Canadian regulatory law on pension surpluses in the 1980s.
32. This tax history is discussed in Schmidt, supra note 4 at paras 34-37, 169 and 186. As the
majority decision emphasizes, these guidelines were not law. The current registration requirement is
found in Information Circular No 72-13R7.
33. In "Contribution Holidays" (1995-1996) 15 Est & Tr J 136 at 137, supra note 2, Eileen Gillese
defines a 'contribution holiday' as a situation in which "in any one year.. .the sponsor's current service
cost is funded partially or entirely from surplus existing in the pension fund." Where the surplus is
large enough, employers may make no contributions for many years.
34. These 'internal' surplus withdrawal strategies typically did not require explicit regulatory
approval. See Gillese, ibid at 159-60 for a review of various statutory rules.
35. This debate is canvassed in both Adell, supra note 29 at 234 and Nachshen, supra note 29 at
75-81. See also Kaplan, supra note 8 at 560-66.
36. Adell, supra note 29 at 235.
37. Ibid
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employee advocates, the trust nature of pension funds simply confirmed
their essential character as the property of employees."' In response to
the employer's 'risk' argument, they observed that pension deficits are
not inevitable; employers control the funds, and can prevent deficits by
prudent management." In addition, employees too bear pension risks:
both the risk of employer insolvency, and the risk that the same economic
factors generating pension surpluses will fuel inflation, eroding the real
value of promised benefits.
Canadian courts in the pre-Schmidt era picked no clear winner in
the surplus debate. In the absence of statutory rules or unambiguous
documents, courts came to differing resolutions,4 0 with outcomes fairly
evenly divided.4 ' Some courts took pension funds at face value: if they
were trust funds, and the employees were the beneficiaries, surplus
belonged to the employees. Others saw surplus as falling outside the
original pension trust 'envelope'; they took a "resulting trust" approach,4 2
holding that surplus should be returned to the 'settlor.' They reached no
clear conclusion, however, as to who the 'settlor' was in the pension
context; some courts saw the employer as the settlor, while others, at least
in contributory plans, saw employers and employees asjoint settlors who
should share the surplus. Challenges to contribution holidays had equally
indeterminate outcomes, with Canadian courts generally holding that the
employer's right to take contribution holidays depended on the specific
wording of the plan.4 3 Case law from other common-law jurisdictions with

38. For a discussion of the flaws in both these sets of arguments, see James Wooten, Arguments about
Asymmetry ofRisks and Rewards and Deferred Wages in Pension Plans(Ontario Expert Commission
on Pensions, 2007).
39. Adell, supra note 29 at 234.
40. The caselaw is exhaustively reviewed in the studies cited in supra note 29. The caselaw on the
contribution holiday issue is discussed in Gillese, "Contribution Holidays," supranote 33.
41. Kaplan's list of surplus ownership cases (supranote 26) gives an edge to employers, with 15
pre-Schmidt victories going to employees and 20 to employers. The list does not include contribution
holiday cases.
42. "[A] resulting trust arises whenever legal or equitable title to property is in one party's name, but
that party, because he is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property, is under an obligation to return
it to the original title owner, or to the person who did give value for it": Donovan WM Waters, Mark
Gillen & Lionel Smith, Waters'Law of Trusts in Canada,3d ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005)
(Waters) at 362.
43. See CUPE Local 1000 v Ontario Hydra (1989), 58 DLR (4th) 552 (Ont CA); Askin v Ontario
HospitalAssociation (1991), 2 OR (3d) 641 (CA).

90 The Dalhousie Law Journal

similar employment pension systems provided Canadian courts with no
clear conceptual guidance."
II. Schmidt andthe tensions within trust law
In Schmidt,45 the first pension surplus case to reach the Supreme Court
of Canada, the Court was invited to rationalize this chaotic legal picture.
Schmidt raised two issues: who was entitled to surplus when the pension
plan was terminated (the "surplus entitlement" issue), and whether the
employer could lawfully draw on surplus while the plan was on-going
to fund its contribution obligations (the "contribution holiday" issue).
Together, these issues offered an opportunity to explore the nature and
content of the pension 'deal' within the context of the employment
contract, and to address the normative/distributive consequences of
permitting employers to use reserved amendment powers to unilaterally
remake pension deals in their own interests. Instead, the Court opted for
an abstract and technical approach. On the surplus entitlement issue, the
Court divided. Led by Cory J., the majority held that surplus claims must
be decided on a case-by-case basis; it awarded part of the surplus to the
employer, and part to one sub-group of employees. In separate reasons, the
two dissenting judges would have given the entire surplus to the employer,
but for different reasons. McLachlin J. (as she then was) grounded her
decision in part on 'resulting trust' principles, while Sopinka J. based his
on the breadth of the employer's power of amendment. 46 The Court then
unanimously validated the employer's contribution holidays, for reasons
which arguably contradict much of the majority analysis on the surplus
entitlement issue. The result is a judgment which evades the conceptual
conundrums behind the surplus problem, fails to resolve the distributive
conflict at the core of the dispute, and offers a very unstable foundation
in principle for the legal rules it instructs Canadian courts to follow in
resolving surplus questions in future.
The Schmidt dispute focused on the Air Products Pension Plan, a DB
plan formed by the merger of two predecessor plans, the Catalytic Plan
and the Steams Plan.47 After shutting down its operations and terminating

44. Both UK and US courts frequently (although not invariably) awarded pension surplus to
employers; UK courts used resulting trust principles, while US courts reached the same result by
giving a broad interpretation to employer amendment clauses within pension plans. The gist of the US
and UK caselaw is summarized by Cory J in Schmidt, supra note 4 at paras 188-89; see also Nachshen,
supra note 29 at 74.
45. Supra note 4.
46. The analysis below focuses on the majority decision.
47. Catalytic Enterprises Ltd and Steams-Rogers Canada Ltd were the corporate predecessors of Air
Products Canada Ltd: see Schmidt, supranote 4 at para 9.

Employee Pension Rights and the False Promise of Trust Law

91

its plan with a substantial surplus, Air Products went to court seeking
a judicial declaration that it was entitled to that surplus, relying on the
language of its current plan text, which clearly sustained its claim.4 8 The
employees asserted their own claim to the terminal surplus. For good
measure, they also challenged various contribution holidays taken by the
company from 1985 to 1988 which had come to light after the wind-up of
the plan. They acknowledged that the plan's current provisions, the result
of recent plan amendments, gave the employer ownership and control of
surplus. They argued, however, that those provisions were not authorized
under the employer's general power to amend the plan; since the entire
pension fund had been established as a trust fund for the employees'
benefit, the employer's attempt to reclaim the surplus was in breach of
trust.
Cory J., writing for the majority, outlines a two-step procedure
for addressing the surplus entitlement issue. The first step requires a
determination of "whether the pension fund is impressed with a trust,"
and whether the surplus is included in that trust. 4 9 That question must be
answered by applying "the ordinary principles of trust law": "[a] trust will
exist whenever there has been an express or implied declaration of trust
and an alienation of trust property to a trustee to be held for specified
beneficiaries."" If a trust is found, Cory J. tells us, it is a "classic" or
"true trust,"" subject to "all applicable trust principles" and "governed by
equity"; "to the extent that applicable equitable principles conflict with plan
provisions, equity must prevail."5 2 If there is no trust, the disposition of the
fund is governed strictly by contract principles." Once the appropriate set
of legal principles has been identified, the analysis moves to the second
step: the application of those principles to plan documents to determine
whose claims should prevail. As Cory J. sees it, trust and contract modes
of analysis yield different conclusions on the scope to be given to the
employer's general power of amendment. If surplus funds are held in trust
for the employees, a plan amendment giving the employer ownership of
those funds is a revocation of trust. Trust law presumes that settlors do
not intend to revoke trusts. Accordingly, general powers of amendment
will not be interpreted to authorize revocation; revocation will only be
permitted if the original plan documents reserved an express power of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Appendix A to Cory 's decision, ibid.
Ibid at para 90.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 52.
Ibid at para 92.
Ibid atpara 91.
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revocation. If there is no trust, by contrast, no issue of the revocation of
the trust arises. Accordingly, on contract principles, a general power of
amendment will sustain an amendment giving the employer ownership of

surplus.5 4
To determine whether the funds at issue are "impressed" with a trust,
Cory J. carefully parses the founding documents of the two predecessor
plans. With respect to the original Catalytic plan, he concludes that a
trust was indeed created, and that the surplus was included in the trust."
With respect to the Steams plan, however, he comes to the opposite
conclusion. He bases this crucial distinction on two differences between
the founding plans. 6 The first is a difference between the plans' initial
funding arrangements. The original 1959 Catalytic plan was funded by
trust agreement and subject to an express declaration of trust. The 1970
Steams Plan, by contrast, was funded under a group annuity contract
which contained no express declaration of trust. Cory J. insists that he is
not dismissing the trust claims of the Steams employees on this formal
ground alone; as he reminds us, a trust may be implied as well as express.5
The absence of a declaration of trust is nevertheless a critical element in
his reasoning; he construes its omission in the Steams documents as "a
deliberate decision to avoid the use of a trust."5
Second, he points to the manner in which the plans address the
distribution of the fund on termination. Both plans generally contemplated
that the funds were held for the "exclusive benefit" of the employees,
and that they could not be "diverted" to any other purpose.59 In addition,
however, the Catalytic plan contained a specific 'non-reversion' clause,
providing that "[i]n the event of termination, the Company cannot recover
any sums paid to the date thereof."60 The Steams plan contained no such
non-reversion clause; drafted a decade later than the Catalytic plan, it
expressly contemplated the possibility of surplus, and provided that any
balance remaining in the fund after pension benefits were accounted for
would, "subject to the approval of the Minister of National Revenue
and the Superintendent of Pensions, be returned to the Company or may
be used for the benefit of Participants, in such equitable manner as the
54. Ibid at paras 59, 66-68.
55. Ibidat para 102.
56. Ibidatpara 120.
57. Ibid at paras 120, 122.
58. Ibid at para 126.
59. Ibid at para 103. For the precise Steams language, see note 21.
60. Ibidat para 106. While this language did not expressly refer to surplus, Cory J nevertheless found
it broad enough to encompass the entire fund. Ironically, the original Catalytic plan was a defined
contribution plan, and therefore incapable of generating a surplus.
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Company may at its discretion determine."61 Since the Catalytic surplus
was "impressed" with a trust, the rights of the Catalytic employees fell to
be determined on trust principles. The employer could not, therefore, rely
on its general power of amendment; since the plan contained no express
authority to revoke the trust, the provisions of the Air Products Plan giving
the employer ownership of surplus were invalid against the Catalytic
employees. For the Steams employees, however, contract law applied; the
terms of the current plan giving the employer ownership of surplus were
valid against them.
After thus dividing the spoils on the surplus entitlement issue, Cory J.
moves on to the contribution holiday issue. As the employees had framed
their case, there was no meaningful legal distinction between the two
issues; if the pension fund was a trust fund to be used for their benefit, the
employer was equally in breach of trust whether it used that fund to make
contributions while the plan was on-going, or appropriated its surplus on
termination. The Alberta courts had taken the same view, sustaining both
claims for the Catalytic employees, and rejecting both for the Steams
employees.62 Cory J. however, sees no parallel between the two issues.
Writing this time for the full court, he does not follow the two-step analysis
he mandated for the surplus entitlement issue. He sees the contribution
holiday issue entirely as an exercise in contract interpretation; indeed, he
emphasizes that the Court's analytic approach on the contribution holiday
issue is identical regardless of the presence of any trust." He forgoes the
historical analysis he pursued on the surplus entitlement issue, focusing
only on the plan documents under which the contribution holiday was
taken.64 The terms of that plan required the employer to contribute only
the "amounts... necessary to provide the retirement benefits accruing
to Members during the current year."65 The evidence established that
pursuant to standard actuarial practice, a determination of the "amounts
necessary" would take account of surplus; in any year where the existing
surplus was large enough, no additional amount would be "necessary" to
fund the benefits, and no contribution would be required. As the court sees
it, the contribution holiday is essentially a 'zero sum' transaction; since
61. Article 14.3 of the 1970 Steams Plan, see ibid at Appendix A.
62. Supra note 4.
63. Ibid at para 95.
64. Ibid at paras 84-85, 113. Because Cory J did not explain his methodology here, the question of
whether an employer could amend a trust-funded plan to allow itself to take contribution holidays or
to pay plan expenses where such power had not originally been provided remained open: see Kaplan,
supra note 8 at 461-66. That issue has now been decided in favour of employer flexibility by Kerry:
see discussion at Part 111(b), below.
65. Ibid atpara 114.
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no money leaves the fund, a contribution holiday does not "reduce the
corpus of the fund."66 Accordingly, despite acknowledging that "employee
beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the total assets of the fund while
it is in existence,"6 Cory J. does not see contribution holidays as raising
any trust concerns. He dismisses the claim for both groups of employees.
Schmidt's abstract approach places very heavy weight on relatively
minor differences in the wording of the original plan documents, almost
entirely ignoring the employment context in which the plans originate.
In construing the documents, lip service is paid to the "intention of the
parties." The differences on which Cory J. focuses are unlikely, however,
to reflect material differences in the intention of the employer about
the rights of the employees; it is much more probable that they reflect
the evolution of income tax rules, choices of insurance instruments
over pooled funds for cash-flow reasons, and differences in 'template'
documents offered by financial service institutions. It is even less likely
that they reflect differences in the intentions of the other party to the
employment contract: the employees. The court shows very little interest
in the practical understandings of the employees about the nature and
content of the pension contract. The Stearns employees led evidence that
two years after the plan was established, the company issued a brochure to
employees advising that "it is the Company's intention the surplus will be
distributed in an equitable manner to the employees active in the Plan at
the date of termination." 68 This is precisely the kind of contextual evidence
used routinely in labour arbitrations (and even in trial courts) to flesh out
the meaning and content of ambiguous employment undertakings; Cory J.
dismisses it as a mere expression of "intention" rather than an undertaking
by the company.69
This is not to say that Cory J. shows no solicitude for the employees.
Faced with a conflict in the authorities on the issue of whether or not
a general power of amendment is capacious enough to authorize an
amendment revoking the trust in whole or in part, Cory J. chooses the
line of authority most favourable to the interests of plan beneficiaries; a
general power of amendment will not be presumed to permit revocation. 0
66. Ibidatpara86.
67. Ibidat para 89.
68. Ibid at para 29. The company's intention to allocate surplus to the employees was further
repeated in a 1982 consolidation of the plan, which was never registered: ibidat Appendix A.
69. Ibid at paras 137-40. The contextual evidence was equivocal; the point is not that this evidence
clearly established a bilateral contractual obligation, but that the court is not interested in making
the kind of fact-based inquiry that would have been necessary to establish the content of individual
employment pension contracts.
70. Sopinka J, dissenting, follows the alternative line of authority: ibid at paras 165-72.
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One factor in his choice is the fact that, in contrast to more conventional
trust situations, employees have given consideration for their pensions.n In
addition, where he finds a trust existing, he takes a decidedly generous view
of the nature of the trust property. On the basis of very general language, he
finds surplus included in the trust. In addition, he finds "impressed" with
a trust not only contributions made while the plan documents contained a
declaration of trust, but also contributions made after the documents were
amended. Conventional trust principles protect the trust nature of prior
contributions (and the income from those contributions).72 These principles
do not, however, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the employer could
not revoke its declaration of trust with respect to new contributions." Cory
J.'s holding that the employer could not amend its declaration of trust with
respect to future contributions is a radical step into unmapped territory;"
in effect he is holding that the contribution obligation itselfis "impressed
with a trust," binding the company not only to its past actions, but also to
commitments made for the future.
These employee-positive elements of the decision are significantly
undermined, however, by other elements that are much less so. I have
already suggested that Cory J.'s distinction between the rights of the
Catalytic and Steams employees on the surplus entitlement issue fails to
take account of the perspective of the employees, the other contracting
'party' whose intentions theoretically inform the Court's analysis. He
is led to make a distinction between the two sets of rights based on a
technical and abstract approach to plan documents drafted unilaterally by
the employer. This abstraction is even more evident in Cory J.'s conclusion
that the contribution holiday issue raises no trust issues. While he freely
acknowledges that "employee beneficiaries have an equitable interest in
the total assets of the fund while it is in existence," 6 he sees that interest as
placing no particular constraints on the employer's right to draw on surplus
within an on-going plan, since that surplus exists only on paper (i.e. is
merely "actuarial"); it does not become "actual" until the plan is wound
7 1. Ibid at para 66.
72. Waters, supra note 42 at 1266-1286. The conventional trust remedy of "tracing" is always
available to track property that was "impressed with a trust" and can still be located.
73. The employer's contribution obligation is essentially a covenant to transfer property into trust.
The important issues of whether such covenants are contractual or trust covenants, whether they are
enforceable, and by whom, have long been controversial among trust lawyers: see Waters, ibid at 18291. None of this controversy is discussed or referred to in Schmidt.
74. This is arguably the gist of Sopinka i's dissent, although he does not refer to future contributions.
75. The argument that the contribution obligation is itself a trust obligation was made by the
employees to the Court of Appeal in Kerry in support of their argument on the DB contribution holiday
issue; the court rejected the argument as inconsistent with Schmidt: Kerry, supra note 13 at para 123.
76. Ibidatpara89.
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up." As the basis for a conclusion that the contribution holiday does not
raise trust issues, this glib distinction between "actuarial" and "actual"
surplus is unpersuasive; while it captures the ephemeral nature of surplus
in an on-going plan, it tells us nothing about whether the employer should
be able to access that surplus for contribution holidays. In her dissent,
McLachlin J. points forcefully to this contradiction in Cory J.'s reasoning:
"if...the fund in equity belongs to the employees in some notional sense,
how can the employer usurp that interest by using the surplus to discharge
its ongoing funding responsibility?"" Gillese likewise finds Cory J.'s
position contradictory. In "Contribution Holidays," a companion article to
"Pension Plans and the Law of Trusts," she argues that there is no basis in
trust principles for Cory J.'s conclusion that contribution holidays do not
breach the trust; on the contrary, such practices encroach directly on the
trust, and are a revocation of trust just as surely as appropriation of surplus
on plan termination.79
Cory J.'s disposition of the contribution holiday issue manifests clear
reluctance to impose fetters on employer control of pension plans while
the plan is on-going. This reluctance to interfere with employer control
is also reflected in his brisk rejection of the proposition that employers
may have fiduciary duties in the context of pension plans irrespective
of whether or not they are formally constituted as trusts. The Steams
employees based their claim to surplus in part on the argument that their
original plan gave the employer nothing more than discretion to determine
how surplus should be dealt with. They argued that the employer was a
fiduciary; since fiduciaries cannot lawfully prefer their own interests over
the interests of those to whom they owe fiduciary duties, the employer
would have been compelled to exercise its discretion in their favour, and
therefore they should be treated as if they had an ownership interest. 0
This argument-that employer pension conduct has fiduciary dimensions
extending beyond the boundaries of formal trusts-has important potential
for insulating employee contract rights from the reach of employer
powers of plan amendment. Cory J. evades the issue, interpreting the plan
language as giving the employees merely a "potential interest" which
77. Ibid at paras 4, 89.
78. ibid at para 191. McLachlin J resolves the contradiction, of course, in favour of the employer's
right to surplus at both stages.
79. Gillese, "Contribution Holidays," supra note 33 at 145. Ultimately, Gillese defends Cory 's
decision despite its contradictions, rationalizing its inconsistencies by arguing that within on-going
plans, pension issues should be governed by contract rather than trust principles at 164.
80. Schmidt, supra note 4 at para 140. This argument undoubtedly over-reaches, since the language
of the plan explicitly contemplated the possibility that the employer might appropriate the surplus to
itself.
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was vulnerable to the general amending power." His refusal to engage
with the fiduciary argument has been an open invitation to employers to
argue that in exercising powers of plan amendment, they owe no fiduciary
duties to plan members, and they have done so with considerable success
in subsequent cases.82
The Court's broad tolerance of employer flexibility while plans are
on-going is linked to concern about the potential consequences to the
employment pension system if employer control is fettered within ongoing plans. In Schmidt, the company made the in terrorem argument
that if employers are not permitted to take contribution holidays, they
will engage in systemic underfunding of their plans. While Cory J.
himself expresses some scepticism about this argument,83 McLachlin J.'s
dissenting opinion bluntly acknowledges the practical hazards of judicial
interference with the power of employers to organize their pension affairs
as they see fit; if they cannot have their own way, they will systematically
underfund their plans, switch from DB to defined contribution (DC) plans,
or decline to provide pensions altogether. "Employees," she argues, "no
longer assured of a specific pension and required to assume the risk of
insufficient funding themselves, would be the losers."84 The importance
of management sovereignty as a sine qua non of a voluntary system is a
theme that will emerge more clearly in subsequent decisions.
It is likewise linked to a tension within trust law itself. Trust law has
always strained to accommodate two contradictory ideas. The first is the
idea that trust law has a moral dimension: that it inhabits a world more
communal and ethical than the market, a paternalistic world in which
courts protect the weak against the powerful. This idea reflects the roots
of trust law in courts of equity, which traditionally enforced moral and
fiduciary commitments not recognized by common law courts, and
imposed standards of 'utmost' fidelity on those who control trust property.
The second is the idea of trust law as merely 'facilitative': a species of
private law, like contract law, in which the primary rights and obligations
of the parties to the trust relationship are constituted outside the courts, and
the role of the courts is simply to interpret and give effect to essentially

81. Ibid at paras 45, 120, 126, 129.
82. Gillese points out that the contribution holiday issue also raises a fiduciary issue; she argues that
contribution holidays violate the fiduciary rule that trust assets must be managed for the sole benefit of
the beneficiaries: "Contribution Holidays," supra note 33 at 145. Her argument appears to be confined
to the Catalytic employees.
83. Schmidt, supranote 4 at 45.
84. Ibid at para 184.
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private arrangements." In his widely cited article, "The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts," John Langbein argues that "virtually all trust
law is default law-rules that the parties can reject. The rules of trust law
apply only when the trust instrument does not supply contrary terms."86
According to this idea of trust law, settlors set the boundaries of their own
trust obligations. Courts do not determine what those obligations should
be, but simply what they are. Their role is one of enforcement. Both
ideas are reflected in the canon of 'trust principles'; some principles are
indefeasible," while others are mere presumptions, defeasible by language
in the trust documents to the contrary.88
Cory J.'s decision clearly reflects this tension. The employee-friendly
aspects of his decision largely reflect the paternalistic and protective
posture of equity courts toward their 'wards.' His language reflects a
fundamentalist posture towards the structure of trusts, which he sees as
having certain "fundamental characteristics." One such characteristic
is the transfer of property rights;" it would be "inconsistent with the
fundamental concept of a trust" for a settlor to remain in control of trust
property once the trust is constituted.90 This fundamentalist conception
competes directly with the notion that settlors are free to make their
trust transfers defeasible, a proposition which, however distasteful, Cory
J. acknowledges as equally entrenched in trust law. He reconciles these
competing ideas by recognizing the right of a settlor to 'take back' a trust
transfer, but demands that the authority to do so must be made explicit in
the trust's originating documents.
While both ideas of trust law inform the judgment in Schmidt, it was
only the first of these ideas-the fundamentalist idea-that held out real
promise to employees and their advocates that trust law would operate as
an independent source of legal protection for employee pension rights.
That idea has not prevailed, and after closely reading Schmidt, we should
not be surprised that it has not. The seeds of its destruction are implicit
in Cory J.'s approach to reconciliation. If employers can over-ride the
most "fundamental" characteristics of a trust simply by inserting explicit

85. See Gregory S Alexander, "The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914"
(1987) 5 Law & Hist Rev 303. Alexander refers to these two ideas of trust law as "regulative" and
"facilitative": ibid at 344.
86. John H Langbein, "The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts" (1995-96) 105 Yale LR 625.
87. John H Langbein, "Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts" (2003-2004) 98 Nw ULR 1105.
88. Trust presumptions are also very fluid, as we see in Schmidt itself; the three judgments reflect
a smorgasbord of approaches to 'default' rules for interpreting the scope of a general power of
amendment in a pension plan.
89. Schmidt, supra note 4 at para 65.
90. Ibid at para 66.
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wording, then it is employers, rather than the courts, who will ultimately
define the scope and content of trust commitments. Unconstrained by core
ethical imperatives, the secret to employer control of pension rights lies
solely in the drafting. As we shall see, it is that facilitative view of trust
law that has carried the day in the Supreme Court's pension jurisprudence.
III. Pension trust law meets the 21st century
1. Buschau v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd. 91
In subsequent pension litigation in Canada, employees challenging
employer amendments relied heavily on Schmidt's broad holding that
pension trusts were "classic trusts," subject to "all applicable trust
principles." They soon discovered, however, that the tensions and
contradictions within the Schmidt approach offered employers a blueprint
for arranging their pension affairs to ensure that any surplus allocated to
employees by the plan documents was depleted prior to plan termination.
Schmidt's shortcomings, from an employee perspective, are clearly
reflected in Buschau v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd. (Buschau), the first test
to reach the highest court of the Schmidt dictum that a pension trust is
subject to "all applicable trust law principles."
Buschau involved a novel issue: an attempt by pension plan members to
invoke the rule in Saunders v. Vautier (the Rule) to terminate their pension
trust. The Rule permits trust beneficiaries to band together unanimously to
ask a court to collapse a trust and distribute the trust property, regardless of
the settlor's intention. Despite its anomalous character, the Rule is a timehonoured "trust principle," well accepted by Canadian courts as one of a
very few truly indefeasible trust principles, 92 and the Buschau plaintiffs
were in distinguished company in their belief that it had relevance to their
situation. In "Pensions and the Law of Trusts," Gillese observed that the
application of the Rule to pensions trusts "appears to be consistent with
its application in the field of trusts generally."93 More pertinent to the
Buschau case, the employees had been encouraged in their claim by the
British Columbia Court ofAppeal, which in the course of related breach of
trust litigation against Rogers, had given them express permission to bring
a Rule-based application.94

91. Buschau, supra note 12.
92. Waters, supra note 42 at 1175-1194. The Rule has fared less well in other jurisdictions. In the
US, for example, it has been substantially modified by common law courts: see Gregory S Alexander,
"The Dead Hand and the Law of Trust" (1984-85) Stanford LR 1189 at 1200-04.
93. Supra note I at 242. Gillese cited Ontario regulatory precedent.
94. Buschau v Rogers Cablesystems Inc, 2001 BCCA 16 at paras 68, 73, 195 DLR (4th) 257, leave
to appeal refused, [2001] SCCA No 107, [Buschau 2001 BCCA].
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To assess where Buschau fits within the evolution of Canadian
pension trust doctrine, it is important to understand something of the
lengthy sequence of litigation that brought the case before the Supreme
Court. In the background was a complex set of corporate restructurings
and plan consolidations. The plan in question, first established in 1974
by Premier Communications Ltd. (PCI), contained an explicit 'nonreversion' clause providing that any surplus assets on termination would
be distributed among plan members. 95 In 1980 PCI was purchased by
Rogers, together with its pension plan. By 1983, the plan had begun to
accumulate significant surplus, a surplus Rogers was determined to use
for its own purposes. 9 6 Over the next decade, Rogers commenced a series
of stratagems to facilitate access to the surplus: it closed the plan to new
members, took contribution holidays, withdrew surplus, replaced noncooperative actuaries and trustees, "restated" (i.e. substantially amended)
the plan to provide retroactive authority for its conduct,97 and ultimately
merged the plan with other Rogers plans that were in deficit, producing a
merged fund with an overall surplus. The merged plan, like the "restated"
plan, expressly gave Rogers ownership of surplus on termination, as well
as permission to withdraw surplus while the plan was on-going.
In 1995, after the Supreme Court issued its Schmidt decision, the
PCI members decided to fight back, initiating litigation to preserve
their trust claim to the by-then very considerable plan surplus.98 They
sought to challenge the company's 1985 withdrawal of surplus, the
contribution holidays and the elimination of their surplus rights. Prior
to the commencement of the trial, Rogers acknowledged that the 1985
surplus withdrawal was in breach of trust; those funds were eventually
repaid. 99 On the contribution holiday issue, both trial and appeal courts
found the plan language indistinguishable from Schmidt and dismissed
the employee claim. 00 With respect to the main issue, however (the
elimination of their surplus rights on termination) the PCI members were
successful; the courts held that the PCI fund had been "impressed with
a trust" for the benefit of PCI members, and that this trust survived both

95. Ibid at para 7.
96. Buschau, supra note 12 at paras 5-6. The company strategy is described more fully in Buschau
2004 BCCA, supra note 12 at para 85.
97. Rogers had already made piecemeal changes to the plan language to this effect, going back as far
as 1981: Buschau 2001 BCCA, supranote 94 at para 7.
98. By 2002 the plan had only 112 members, and a surplus which had started out in 1980 at
approximately $800,000 had grown to $11 million: Buschau, supranote 12 at paras 1-2, 5.
99. Buschau 2001 BCCA, supra note 94 at paras 23-24, 37.
100. While the contribution holiday was arguably contrary to federal regulations in effect prior to
1987, the Court found that part of the claim statute-barred: ibidat para 36.
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the plan amendments and the merger. The PCI members had given notice
that if they were successful in establishing their trust rights, they would
seek to terminate the trust by invoking the Rule. The Court of Appeal held
that "the right of the members to invoke Saunders v. Vautier... remains
unaffected by the merger.""o' Their subsequent application to apply the
Rule proceeded successfully through the British Columbia courts.'02 On
further appeal, however, their claim was dismissed by a Supreme Court
of Canada unanimously of the view that the Rule was inapplicable to the
modem pension trust.
The Supreme Court offers a variety of reasons for finding the Rule
inapplicable to trusts in the employment pension context. First among
them is its inconsistency with the regulatory scheme, a reason which alone
would have provided solid ground on which to base the Court's decision.
The Court goes on, however, to denounce the Rule not simply for its
inconsistency with the regulatory scheme, but also for its inconsistency
with employer pension objectives. Deschamps J., writing the Court's main
judgment, emphasizes the employer's business interest in an on-going
pension plan. Compared to that interest, she characterizes the interest of
any individual beneficiary as "ephemeral," "passive" and "limited." 0 3
"[E]mployers establish plans because it is in their interest to do so. Under
normal circumstances," she admonishes, "they have the right not to have
their management decisions disturbed."'" Common law trust rules like
the rule in Saunders v. Vautier must give way because they "allow no
room for the settlor's interest."' In his concurring judgment, Bastarache
J. shows even more deference to employer rights and interests, stressing
the voluntary nature of the employment pension system: "the unique role
of the employer in respect of the pension plan and the pension Trust cannot
be ignored; and the terms of the contract at the root of the Trust cannot be
circumvented." 06 The plaintiff's attempt to invoke the rule in Saunders v.
Vautier is, in his view, "a very significant derogation from an employer's
right to voluntarily choose to offer or continue a pension plan," tilting the
"fair and delicate balance between employer and employee interests" so
far towards employees as to pose a threat to the survival of the system. 0
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Ibid at para 68.
Buschau 2004 BCCA, supra note 12.
Buschau, supra note 12 at para 34.
Ibid at para 30.
Ibid. The settlor is assumed to be the employer.
Ibid at para 94.
Ibid at para 97.
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These judicial observations place in high relief the conflict between
employer and employee interests on pension issues. They also provide
an unambiguous signal that where these interests clash, the court willpaternalistically, of course, and in the employees' own better interest-take
up the side of the employer. The Buschau court repeats Schmidt's holding
that pension trusts are "classic trusts," and subject to "all applicable trust
law principles."'o The emphasis is now, however, on the qualifications in
Cory J.'s phraseology-only applicable trust principles will be brought
to bear. While continuing to pay lip service to trust primacy, the Court
is edging away from Schmidt's holding that the terms of the trust take
precedence over the terms of the plan.109 It now describes the plan and
the trust as "indissociable,""o subtly but unequivocally undermining
Schmidt's notion that trust law operates as a source for employee pension
rights independent of employer control over the pension plan. We have
clearly left the land of Schmidt, in which trust law still has a stable ethical
dimension; pension trusts now inhabit a world in which Rogers' trustdepleting stratagems are understood to be a "rational business decision."''"
2. Nolan v. Kerry (Canada) Ltd.112
Without repudiating Schmidt's holding that pension funds may endow
employees with trust rights, Buschau enhances the power of employers to
prevent trust rights from being triggered. From the employer perspective,
Buschau signalled the Court's willingness to take "a more reasonable
approach" on trust issues than it had done in Schmidt."3 Three years later,
in Nolan v. Kerry (Canada)Ltd., the Court sanctioned a further expansion
of the pension powers of employers to amend trust-based plans without
trust consequences. The case involved a DB plan established in 1954
by the Canadian Doughnut Company Ltd. For some thirty years, the
employer had contributed annually and paid plan-related expenses.114 In
the mid-1980s, when the plan began to accumulate significant surplus,

108. Buschau, supra note 12 at para 61.
109. Ibid at para 95.
110. Ibidatpara 29.
Ill. Ibid at paras 102-103. Bastarache J does not specifically endorse this characterization of the
employer's conduct, but he clearly sympathetizes with it. So, apparently, did the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions, who subsequently made an order permitting Rogers to dissolve the 1992 plan
merger and reopen the PCI plan to new members more than twenty-five years after it had initially
closed it: see Buschau v Rogers Communications Inc, [2009] SCCA no 457.
112. Kerry, supra note 13.
113. Barbara Austin& Paul Dimitriadis, "Not All Trust Law Principles Apply To Pension Trusts: The
Supreme Court Of Canada Decision in Buschau v Rogers Communications Inc" (2006-07) 26 Est Tr
& Pensions J 217 at 217.
114. Kerry, supra note 13 at paras 3-6.

Employee Pension Rights and the False Promise of Trust Law

103

the employer began to take contribution holidays and to pay expenses out
of the pension fund, amending the plan to facilitate these transactions.
In 1994, the company was bought by Kerry (Canada), which continued
both these strategies. Effective 2000, Kerry amended the plan to alter the
benefit structure significantly. The amended plan was a 'two-tier' plan,
including the old DB plan (now closed to new employees), and a new
DC component for new employees and current employees who chose to
convert their DB benefits. With the announcement of the new plan, Kerry
also announced its intention to use the DB surplus not just to continue its
contribution holidays with respect to DB benefits, but also to fund its DC
contribution obligations.
Current employees opposed the registration of the new plan,
challenging both the use of DB surplus to fund defined contributions (the
DC contribution holiday issue), and the payment of plan and trust expenses
out of the pension fund (the plan expenses issue)."' Relying on Schmidt,
they argued that their fund, including surplus, was "impressed" with a
trust, limiting it to uses "for the exclusive benefit" of plan beneficiaries;
the challenged practices put trust funds to uses that benefited the employer,
not the employees."I The employer, relying equally on Schmidt, argued that
both its payment of plan expenses and its proposed contribution holidays
raised no trust issues. The employees vigorously challenged the analogy
with the DB contribution holidays addressed in Schmidt, pointing out
that both the payment of plan expenses and the DC contribution holidays
unequivocally involved a departure of monies from the DB pension fund,
and therefore encroached on the "corpus of the fund."
The case went first before the Ontario Financial Services Tribunal."'
The Tribunal made relatively short work of the plan expenses issue. It
was not persuaded that either the plan text or trust principles limited the
power of the employer to pay expenses from the fund, as long as those
expenses were reasonably incurred in the operation of the plan and the
fund."' It had considerably more trouble, however, validating the DC
contribution holiday under conventional trust analysis. As we have seen,
the plan which the employer sought to register was structured as a twopart plan, acknowledging two separate funding agreements, one for the

115. There were additional issues, including a contribution holiday in relation to the DB benefits
which was disposed of in accordance with the Schmidt decision; those issues will not be discussed
here.
116. The Tribunal agreed with this interpretation of the plan documents: Kerry OFSCD No 1, supra
note 13 at paras 13-14.
117. Kerry OFSCD No I and 2, supra note 13.
118. Kerry OFSCD No 1, ibid at paras 24-28.
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DB fund and one for the individual DC accounts, with different financial
service providers. Only the first was a trust agreement; the second was
an insurance policy. The "contribution holiday" for the DC plan required
that monies be transferred from the trust fund to the insurer for deposit
into individual employee accounts. The Tribunal was persuaded that
these mechanics constituted a breach of trust, since the exercise involved
removing monies from the trust fund. Remarkably, however, the Tribunal
saw this breach of trust as a mere technical impediment, which could be
readily cured by a set of retroactive amendments making the DC members
"beneficiaries of the trust in respect of the Fund (in which case it would
seem to follow that the insurance policy that is the funding vehicle for [the
DC benefits] should be held by the trustee)."" 9 With such amendments
in place, the Tribunal saw no fundamental difference between the type of
contribution holiday which the Schmidt court had found to be valid, and the
contribution holiday at issue in this case; in both situations, the employer
would simply be moving monies around under the trust umbrella.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the Tribunal
decision on the plan expenses issue. While Rothstein J., writing for the
full Court, acknowledges that the plan did not expressly authorize the
payment of the expenses at issue, he holds that an employer need not find
authority to pay expenses within the four corners of the plan documents;
it has implied authority to pay expenses from the fund, and an amendment
to authorize such payments expressly effects no substantive change. He
rejects out of hand the employee argument that the expenses amendment
violates the "exclusive benefit" clause. The term "exclusive benefit," in his
view, simply cannot "be construed to mean that no one but the employees
can benefit from the use of the trust funds."' 20 Pension plans, he notes, are
designed to provide substantial benefits to employers, who use them for
"attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred compensation, settling
or avoiding strikes, providing increased compensation without increasing
wages, increasing employee turnover, and reducing the likelihood of
lawsuits by encouraging employees who would otherwise have been laid
off to depart voluntarily." 2' As Rothstein J. sees it, since the plan provides
benefits for the employees, and its expenses must be paid in order for the
plan to continue, an amendment which permits those expenses to be paid
out of the fund is "to the exclusive benefit of the employees, within the

119.

Kerry OFSCD No 2, supra note 13 at paras 32-34, 41.
120. Kerry, supranote 13 at para 53 [emphasis added].
121. Ibid at para 54.
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meaning of [the plan]."l 22 He does not advert to the obvious fact that in the
case before him, the employees had benefitted more from the employer's
thirty-year practice of paying expenses from outside the fund. Nor does
he advert to the ample evidence of representations made by the employer
over the years to the employees that, in addition to making contributions,
it was paying the plan expenses.123 Like Cory J. in Schmidt, he appears
to see such contextual evidence as irrelevant to the meaning of the plan
documents.
On the DC contribution holiday issue, the majority of the Court
finds nothing to criticize in the Tribunal's approach. The employees had
grounded their argument on basic trust principles, arguing that since the
fund had been accumulated to support the DB plan, it was a trust for the
benefit of DB plan members. Under the new arrangement, the employer
was now depleting that trust fund to meet very different obligations in an
essentially different plan. The majority, however, was much less interested
in the principles than it was in the mechanics behind the arrangement. Like
the Tribunal, it took the view that if both DB and DC members are made
beneficiaries of a single trust, the trust law problem vanishes.'12 4
This solution, of course, simply begs the question before the Court:
the question of whether the employer's proposal to draw on the trust
fund to make its DC contributions is consistent with the trust restrictions
governing the use of these funds. When Rothstein J. speaks of retroactive
amendments to the 2000 Plan to ensure that the two funding instruments
can become the property of "one trust in which all DB and DC members
are beneficiaries," 25 his language suggests that this trust exists in some
concrete form outside the court; all that is necessary is to bring the DC
members under its aegis. In fact, if there ever was a concrete 'trust,' 1 26 the
plan's history has erased it. The trust agreement from the 1950s which
created the Schmidt-based trust rights on which the Kerry employees rely
is no longer in effect. The plan documents currently include a new 2000
trust agreement for the DB members, with a different financial service
provider. This document cannot be "the trust" contemplated by the
122. Ibidat para 55.
123. The Tribunal had rejected this evidence as at most "the description of a practice.. and not as an
undertaking": Kerry OFSCD no. 1, supra note 13 at para 23.
124. Ibid at para 84.
125. Kerry, supra note 13 at para 84. At times, Rothstein J appears to be under the erroneous
impression that an 'umbrella' pension trust already exists somewhere; in his recital of the facts, he
observes that "[t]he Trust Fund was constituted in two separate funding vehicles, with two separate
trustees": ibidat para 7.
126. A trust is traditionally defined either as a relationship entailing certain rights and duties, or
simply as a set of obligations: Waters, supra note 42 at 4-5; arguably, a trust is always an abstraction.
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Rothstein decision, however, since it does not, on its face, protect the trust
rights created by the earlier agreement. 2 7 In reality, the trust at issue here
is simply a set of legal obligations, originally created by a trust agreement
drafted in the 1950s, but now "impressed" upon funds held under quite
different practical arrangements. The rights flowing from those obligations
are a judicial construct, existing only to the extent that the Court is willing
to define and protect them. In permitting the employer to expropriate DB
surplus for use in funding DC benefits, the majority is doing much more than
correcting a minor flaw in the mechanics of the employer's arrangements.
It is defining the limits of its willingness to sanction employee trust claims
on pension funds when those claims conflict with the business objectives
of employers. Those limits have shifted considerably since Schmidt.
Lebel J., joined by Fish J. in a vigorous dissent, is not taken in by the
"single trust" metaphor. The hallmark of the law of trust, Lebel J. points
out, is "the protection of the beneficiaries, who are entitled to have the
trust property administered in their best interest." 28 One of its purposes is
to "provide[]... an added layer of protection" 29 for plan beneficiaries. In
Lebel J.'s view, it is simply perverse to characterize the DC contribution
holiday as for the "exclusive benefit" of the employees: "it is hard to
see how the DC contribution holidays benefit anyone but Kerry, who is
relieved of its contribution obligations to the DC plan." 3 0 For him, Kerry's
new plan is essentially two plans, not one plan;' 3 ' he can therefore find
no meaningful distinction between the employer's initial strategy and
the Tribunal's proposed remedy. In both cases, monies move from the
fund supporting the DB plan-the original trust fund-to DC individual
accounts. Viewed functionally and not simply through the abstract lens
of plan draftsmanship, the employer's DC contribution holiday strategy
involves "an encroachment on irrevocable trust funds," 3 2 stripping
monies from the fund supporting the DB benefits for purposes unrelated
to those benefits. This reality does not change simply by describing it
differently; as Lebel J. put it, "[i]t would make a mockery of the significant

127. Kerry OFSCD no 2, supra note 13 at paras 2-4. The new trust agreement was silent on ("did not
repeat") the non-diversion rights which had constituted the trust over surplus in the old agreement;
the Tribunal found itself unable to remedy this deficiency, but took comfort in the fact that the new
agreement did not expressly abrogate those rights: Kerry OFSCD no. 1, supra note 13 at paras 33-34.
128. Ibid at para 186.
129. Ibid atpara 191.
130. Ibidat para 184.
131. "DB plans and DC plans are not cut from the same cloth"; they "carry a different set of risks and
rewards": ibid at para 159.
132. Ibidat para 144.
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protections afforded to trust funds" if the DC members could be made trust
beneficiaries "by the mere stroke of a pen. "133
Like Schmidt, Kerry confronted the Court with a direct clash between
employee trust claims and the employer's broad power of plan amendment.
In Schmidt, the Court reconciled that clash by 'reading down' the
employer's power of amendment where trust rights are at issue. In Kerry,
however, the Court takes the opposite tack, 'reading down' the trust rights
and broadening the range of the power of amendment. Lebel J.'s view of
trust law as a robust barrier protecting vulnerable plan beneficiaries against
employer self-interest loses out to Rothstein's much more attenuated view
of "exclusive benefit" and to his highly plastic view of the nature of the
trust envelope.
3. Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co.
In Buschau and Kerry, the Supreme Court set a post-Schmidt course which
gives employers broad power to deploy trust funds within on-going plans
and corrrespondingly narrow duties to exercise their powers in the best
interests of plan beneficiaries. The Court's most recent decision, Burke
v. Hudson's Bay Co.,' 34 confirms and extends that trajectory. The case
involved a claim by a group of former employees of the Northern Stores
Division of the Hudson's Bay Company (the Bay), a division whose long
and unique history was reflected in its continuing label as the "fur trade
division."'3 5 These employees, along with other Bay employees, were
members of a DB plan established by the company in 1961. In 1987, after
a severe downturn in the retail industry, the Bay sold the Northern Stores
Division, with the pension liabilities of active employees included in the
transaction. As part of the sale, the Bay transferred from its pension fund
assets equivalent in value to the employee pension benefits.'3 ' Although
the plan was in surplus at the time of the sale, no surplus was included.1 7
The affected employees challenged the company's decision not to transfer
any of the surplus. Their principal argument was that they had a trust
claim to the surplus, based both on the language of the plan and on the
employers' practice and representations to plan members over the years.
In the alternative they argued, based on Schmidt's dictum that "employee
beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the total assets of the fund
133. Ibid at para 179.
134. Supra note 14.
135. Burke ONSC, supra note 14 at para 30.
136. The plan was registered in Ontario, where this type of transaction is governed by ss 80-81 of the
PBA.
137. The agreement of purchase and sale provided for a price adjustment if the Bay were at any time
ordered to make a surplus transfer: see Burke, ONSC, supra note 14 at para 130.
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while it is in existence,"' that regardless of who owned the surplus, the
employer had a fiduciary obligation to treat all plan beneficiaries with
an "even hand," entitling them to have a share of the surplus transferred.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it was this
fiduciary argument that was at the centre of the appeal.'" 9
To understand the significance of the Court's decision on the fiduciary
issue, it is important to understand how prior Canadian courts and tribunals
had characterized fiduciary obligations in the pension context. The
common law imposes fiduciary duties in situations in which one party to
whom another is peculiarly vulnerable has discretion or power which can
be unilaterally exercised so as to affect that other party's legal or practical
interests.14 0 Employers who administer pension plans appear to fit this
fiduciary mould, and most pension regulatory statutes in Canada impose
fiduciary duties on employers in their administrative roles.141 In addition
to plan administration, however, employers perform numerous additional
functions-establishing and amending plans and trust agreements,
making decisions about benefit and contribution levels and the payment
of expenses, negotiating merger and asset transfer agreements-that also
arguably meet the common law fiduciary test. Courts and tribunals have
been hesitant, however, to impose fiduciary fetters on employers furthering
their business interests within pension plans; as the Ontario Pension
Commission bluntly put it, if employer powers of amendment were judged
by fiduciary standards, "of what use would a power of amendment be?"1 4 2
To reconcile fiduciary rules with the perceived need to provide
employers with flexibility, adjudicators have conveniently developed a
'two hats' doctrine, which distinguishes between employers acting as plan
administrators and employers acting in other capacities (e.g. in conducting
their employment relations). The 'two hats' doctrine saddles employers
with fiduciary responsibilities only when acting as administrators, leaving

138. Schmidt, supra note 4 at para 89.
139. The Burke litigation commenced in 1993, with employees claiming ownership of surplus, and
challenging both contribution holidays and plan expense payments. As the case proceeded through the
courts, the employees dropped the contribution holiday issue, proceeding to the Supreme Court on the
plan expenses and the surplus ownership issues, as well as the fiduciary argument. They lost on all
counts based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of complex provisions in their plan documents.
This discussion focuses on the fiduciary issue.
140. See Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 at para 60 per Wilson J (dissenting). The Frame test was
invoked in Burke, supra note 14 at para 39.
141. Under pension legislation, "administrators" are those responsible for plan governance. There
is considerable variation in how the statutes deal with fiduciary duties: see, for example, Pension
Benefits Standards Act, 1985, RSC 1985, c 32 (2d Supp) s 8(3); PBA, ss 19, 22; Pension Benefits
StandardsAct, RSBC 1996, c 352, s 8(5), (6); SupplementalPension PlansAct, RSQ, c R- 17, s 150.
142. Imperial Oil v Ontario(Superintendent of Pensions) (1997), 18 CCPB 198 at para 33.
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them free when wearing other 'hats' to make decisions which may injure
the interests of employee beneficiaries.' 4 3 The 'two hats' doctrine places
a significant premium on how employer conduct is categorized. For this
reason, the Bay argued vigorously in Burke that its decision to refuse to
transfer any surplus to the successor employer's plan was not made in its
capacity as plan administrator, and was therefore not subject to fiduciary
standards.'4 4
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision penned by Rothstein
J., holds that the transfer decision was an administrator's decision and
therefore attracted fiduciary analysis.'45 The Court nevertheless exonerates
the employer of any breach of trust. Rothstein J.'s analysis focuses closely
on the plan text. He acknowledges that the pension fund at issue is a trust
fund that "must be administered according to trust principles"; indeed,
the parties before him had conceded as much.14 6 For him, however, the
key issue is not the nature of the rights at issue-whether they are trust
or contract rights-but the content of the rights, which he sees as defined
solely by the plan documents, and which can therefore be determined only
on a construction of those documents. 147 The Court's intense focus on the
plan text is not easy to reconcile with the Schmidt holding that "to the
extent that applicable equitable principles conflict with plan provisions,
equity must prevail."l 48 The Buschau Court had already taken a step back
from trust pre-eminence by emphasizing the integrated nature of the
plan text and the funding documents. The Burke Court steps back even
further; it accords primacy to the pension plan over the trust agreement
on the ground that the plan itself-a contract-makes itself the dominant
document.14 9 Schmidt's holding that trust documents prevail over contract
provisions as a matter of trustprinciple appears no longer to be good law.
143. The first explicit Canadian reference to the 'two hats' doctrine appears in Imperial Oil, ibid.
While the case was decided in the context of the statutory fiduciary obligation in Ontario, Canadian
courts in a variety ofjurisdictions have applied a common law version of the doctrine: see, for example,
OMERS Sponsors Corporation v OMERS Administrative Corporation,[2008] OJ no 425 (Sup Ct J);
Lloyd v Imperial Oil, 2008 ABQB 379, [2008] 9 WWR 502; Sutherland v Hudson Bay Co, [2007] OJ
no 2979 at paras 310-16 (Sup Ct J); Lieberman v Business Development Bank of Canada,2009 BCSC
1312 at paras 75-90, [2009] BCJ no 1938; and Associationprovinciale des retraitisd'Hydro-Qudbec
c Hydro-Quebec, 2005 QCCA 304, [2005] QJ no 1644; Indalex Limited (Re), 2011 ONCA 265, leave
to appeal to the SCC granted, 2011 CanLII 77231.
144. See factum of the respondent at para 109, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.calfactumsmemoires/32789/FMO20_RespondentGovernor-and-Company-of-Adventurers-of-EnglandTrading-into-Hudson's-Bay.pdf>.
145. Burke, supra note 14 at paras 41, 85.
146. Ibid at para 49.
147. E.g. ibid at paras 88-89.
148. Schmidt, supra note 4 para 92.
149. Burke, supra note 14 at para 79.
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The Bay, of course, had drafted the documents, and had taken care to
limit employee rights strictly to the pension benefits provided by the plan,
leaving the fate of the rest of the fund within the employer's control.5 0
Accordingly, as the Court interpreted the plan, employee trust rights did
not include the right to surplus, either on plan termination or while the plan
was on-going."' From the employees' perspective, however, the fact that
the employer owned the surplus did not dispose of the fiduciary argument.
As they saw it, whatever the scope of their strict legal rights, the employer
had an over-riding fiduciary duty of even-handedness mandating an
equitable division of the surplus. Rothstein J. takes a purely documentsbased approach to this argument as well. In his view, the duty of evenhandedness applies only with respect to the rights of the employees under
the plan: "[t]he duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of
the pension plan documentation."' 5 2 Since the employees had no right to
53
surplus, "there is no duty of even-handedness applicable to the surplus."'
While he does not expressly distance the court from Cory J.'s dictum that
"employee beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the total assets of the
fund while it is in existence,"' 54 Rothstein J. limits its reach to situations in
which employees can make out a trust claim to the entire fund, including
surplus. Where employees have no such claim, the Burke court sees their
"equitable interest" as limited only to that portion of the pension fund
necessary to support payment of their benefits at any given time.'55 Under
those circumstances, Rothstein J. views the company's refusal to transfer
surplus as a "legitimate commercial transaction.""'
The Court's conclusion-that employees who cannotmake out a case for
surplus ownership on plan termination cannot insist on a transfer of surplus
on plan sale-is practical, if not inevitable; any surplus transfer in these
circumstances would be a windfall to the new employer.'15 Nonetheless,
the Court's reasoning is problematic. Equitable rules governing fiduciary
duties have conventionally been conceptualized as supplementing, rather
150. Ibid at para 63. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, as it had done in Schmidt and Kerry,
dismisses as irrelevant contextual evidence of past practice and representations to the employees that
might have shed light on the 'real deal' between the employer and the employees.
151. Ibid at paras 31, 34 (plan expenses), 83 (surplus).
152. Ibid at para 85.
153. Ibid.
154. Schmidt, supra note 4 at para 89.
155. Burke, supranote 14 at paras 51-60.
156. Ibid at para 91. The Court expressly leaves open the question of whether employees with a
Catalytic-type ownership interest in surplus would be entitled to have a portion of surplus transferred:
ibid at para 96.
157. Recent Ontario amendments, however, require a share of any surplus to be included in an asset
transfer: PBA, s 80 (13)§4 (not yet in force).
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than replicating, legal rules with respect to beneficiary rights. They have
been understood to fetter not just conduct that is unlawful for other
reasons, but also conduct, such as abuse of discretion, that would not
otherwise be legally objectionable. Waters observes that "[t]he duty to
act impartially [i.e. the duty of even-handedness] is usually associated in
practice with circumstances where the trustees have administrative powers
which involve exercises of discretion".' To relieve fiduciaries of any duty
of even-handedness in respect to discretionary decisions, as the Burke
decision can be read to do, would be a very substantial derogation from
fiduciary protections.
It is unlikely that the Burke Court means to effect so radical a change
in the law. More likely, the Court means only to adopt the proposition
articulated much more explicitly by the Court of Appeal: the proposition
that the duty of even-handedness is a 'default' principle, which can be
excluded by the terms of a particular trust instrument. While Gillese J.A.,
writing for the Court of Appeal, acknowledged the "fundamental trust
principle.. .that beneficiaries of a trust are to be treated in an even-handed
fashion--one group of beneficiaries is not to be preferred over another,"' 9
she emphasized an important caveat to this general principle; the duty of
even-handedness applies "unless the trust instrument so decrees." In her

view, by giving the Bay the right to use surplus as it saw fit, the trust
instrument in question "displaces the even-handedness requirement in
respect of Plan members." 6 0 When the Supreme Court observes, then, that
"[t]he duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of the pension
plan documentation,"' 6 ' it may only be reminding us that much 'trust
principle' is 'default law,' yielding to the terms of the specific documents
which constitute the trust. Since both the drafting and amending of trust
documents is primarily controlled by employers, however, employees and
their advocates can take little comfort from this gloss.
From an employee perspective, the good news is that the Burke
decision does not explicitly embrace the 'two hats' doctrine, which relieves
employers of fiduciary responsibilities except in their administrator's
role.'62 The bad news, however, is that the decision may have rendered the
158. Waters, supra note 42 at 967.
159. Burke ONCA, supra note 14 at para 59 [emphasis in original].
160. Ibidat para 60.
161. Burke, supra note 14 at para 85.
162. In a case note in Benefits Canada (October 7, 2010), Gary Nachshen argues that although there
is no reference to the doctrine in the court's decision, the Supreme Court "implicitly blessed the two
hats doctrine" in its Burke decision. While I disagree, I see the outcome as even more damaging to
employee interests than the 'two hats' doctrine. The Supreme Court will soon get another opportunity
to consider the "two hats" doctrine, since it has granted leave to appeal in Indalex, supranote 143.
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"two hats" doctrine obsolete by clearing the way for employers to set their
own limits on the scope and content of their fiduciary duties even in their
role as plan administrators. Burke suggests that regardless of what 'hat' the
employer is wearing, there is no 'trust principle' sturdy enough to stand
against plan language relieving the employer of fiduciary responsibilities
that would otherwise flow from the common law. As the Supreme Court
now sees it, trust law does not impede discretionary decisions made in
furtherance of "legitimate commercial transactions," as long as such
decisions are sanctioned by the plan documents.
Conclusion: trust law andpension law reform
Schmidt's core holding that employee pension rights are rooted in trust law
as well as in contract law signalled that employer self-interest would not be
allowed unfettered sway within employment pension plans. To paraphrase
Lebel J. in Kerry, Schmidt promised that trust law would provide an
"added layer of protection" for employee rights not available under the
law of contract. In subsequent cases, however, the court has stripped trust
law of any such protective capacity, in favour of a facilitative idea of trust
law in which the boundaries of employee pension rights are effectively
created and limited by the terms of the plan documents. Typically, those
documents are controlled by employers, who use their power to promote
their own interests. There is little evidence that Canada's Supreme Court
sees this as a problem; on the contrary, the court has evidenced a clear
preference for pension rules that minimize impediments to "rational
business decisions" and "legitimate commercial transactions."
The jurisprudence has overtaken Gillese's optimistic prediction that
trust law would provide "the principles and approaches which can lead to
a sensible and successful development" of pension law.'16 Our Supreme
Court's current version of trust law, which allows employers to write the
pension script, fails to account adequately for the employee interest. The
courts themselves have recognized that pension litigation outcomes are
frequently arbitrary from the employee perspective. In Schmidt itself,
Cory J. observed: "[i]t seems unfair that there should be a different result
for these two groups of employees based only upon a finding that a trust
was created in one case but not in the other."l6 4 Courts have preferred
to attribute troublesome jurisprudence to the limitations of the common
law, however, rather than taking responsibility for fixing it. Cory J. argued
that "the courts are limited in their approach by the necessity of applying

163. Gillese, supra note I at 224.
164. Schmidt, supra note 4 at paras 39 and 150.
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the sometimes inflexible principles of contract and trust law," and called
for legislation to address the distributive issues which he clearly saw at
the core of the Schmidt dispute.'65 Subsequent courts have echoed this cri
de coeur to relieve them of the difficult burden of sorting out rights and
obligations within employment pension plans.' 66
Courts should not be so quick to give themselves a pass on their
performance in these pension cases. The analysis of the case law in this
paper has identified numerous analytic nodes where courts applying the
common law have made choices-choices not dictated by "the law," but
by predispositions and values, and the weighing of those policy factors
they identify as relevant and important. The indeterminate nature of the
law itself is reflected in Schmidt, where the majority and two dissenting
judges come to three different conclusions about how to reconcile pension
commitments with general powers of plan amendment under the umbrella
of trust law. It is likewise reflected in Buschau, where the Court rejects the
application of a "classic trust principle" at least in part on the grounds that
it would thwart employer pension objectives. It is clear in Kerry, where
dissenting judges accuse the majority of making a "mockery" of trust
principles by allowing breach of trust to be remedied by the retroactive
"stroke of a pen." And it is clear again in Burke, where the Court permits
an employer to use its power over plan drafting to erase its fiduciary duty
to exercise discretion in an even-handed fashion. The outcomes in these
cases are of the Court's own making.
The task of deploying the common law to make sense of employment
pension rights and obligations is not an easy one. Employment pension
plans do not fit neatly into pre-existing legal paradigms. The statutory
context within which such plans function creates additional interpretive
challenges. In unionized workplaces, collective bargaining adds a further
layer of complexity. But simply turning the problem over to legislatures
offers no ready solution. As Ari Kaplan points out, legislatures have
shown considerable reluctance over the years to take up the hot potato
of employee pension rights and grapple with the real equities. 6 71In prior
rounds of pension reform, governments have shown a propensity to dodge
the distributive questions raised by these cases. Legislative activity to
date in our current round of pension reform in Canada suggests that so
far, governments are running true to form. Some jurisdictions have taken

165. Ibid at paras 39 and I50.
166. See, for example, Burke ONSC, supra note 14 at para 113.
167. Kaplan, supra note 8 at 553-54. Gillese made this point as well in "Pension Trusts," supra note
I at 250.
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recent modest steps to address the most visible aspect of the Schmidt
legacy, its indeterminate resolution of the question of surplus ownership
on plan termination. In doing so, however, they have largely settled for
procedural reforms that establish administrative mechanisms for resolving
ownership questions, avoiding the substantive distributive questions.168
Almost twenty years after Schmidt, we are still searching for a stable
and coherent theory of employment pension rights. Clearly legislatures
must be pressured to take on a more substantive role in shaping new
frameworks for pension rights; they have tools that common law courts
do not possess. But courts too have an indispensable role to play. Our
Supreme Court's current version of trust law, a version which empowers
rather than restrains employers in the pursuit of their self-interest, must
be declared a failure. There are, however, common law paths which the
courts have yet to explore. They must be challenged to find a contract
law which accords employees genuine agency as contracting parties, or a
re-imagined trust law which reclaims its normative fiduciary content, or
some novel hybrid of the two that can lead to fairer distributive outcomes
and increased retirement income security within the employment context
within which pension plans operate.

168. For example, recent amendments to Ontario's PBA (new s 55.1 to the PBA), provide some
clarification on contribution holidays, but expressly do not over-ride plan provisions. Likewise,
new s 77.11(5) permits surplus withdrawal, but only if there is a surplus-sharing agreement. Surplus
allocation issues arising out of plan wind-ups may now go to arbitration (77.12), but arbitration is not
mandatory, and the amendment does not spell out what criteria are to be applied by the arbitrator in
making a determination.

